The Angola
Report
Vol. 7, No. 1           April 1999

Executive Director's Comments:

The Lusaka Peace Process
The End in Sight?

 

On January 9, 1998, the Government of Angola and UNITA announced an ambitious schedule to conclude the long-delayed Lusaka peace process by the end of February. The response within Angola and internationally was generally favorable but there was also some skepticism, particularly at the short timetable projected to accomplish so many difficult tasks. This is entirely understandable if you consider that the process was originally supposed to be finished by February 1997. Since the treaty was signed in November 1994, there have often been similar "breakthroughs". Equally as often, however, they were followed by missed deadlines or other disappointments. It was natural for even the optimists to question such an accelerated new calendar. "The end in sight, they asked? We have been hearing that refrain regularly since the treaty was signed. Yet we still do not have a completely disarmed UNITA force and the country still retains divisions. Granted that peace may be closer, but remember that war could also reak out again."

As an ambitious and optimistic January turned sourly into a disappointing and dangerous February, it looked for a time as if the foretellers of doom and gloom were going to be vindicated at last. There was virtually no progress in fulfilling January’s ten steps to complete the Lusaka process and the long-awaited meeting between Dr. Savimbi and President dos Santos slipped completely off the schedule. There were new and troubling instances of attacks on Government-administrated towns and accusations of gearing up for a new round of fighting flew back and forth. Then in March, the peace process roller coaster started back up the slope. A new timetable was announced to complete the entire process by April 1. Real progress was accomplished, albeit with mutual suspicion and most often ill will as well. UNITA declared itself fully demilitarized, i.e. no more armed forces, and the Government reciprocated by fully legalizing UNITA as a political party. A week later, an agreement was reached on Dr. Savimbi’s personal security, his "special status" was promulgated and UNITA’s remaining senior military officers were demobilized.

Still the sceptics are not ready to go into hiding. Even a experienced and pragmatic Ambassador in Washington said that he was not optimistic about adherence to the latest timetable. The pessimists continue to see the process as fatally flawed because of the mutual lack of trust and the resulting psychology of "if he wins, I loose." The classic zero-sum conundrum.

Is this pessimism justified? Or is it time to move past the mutual mistrust that has for so long been one of the most intractable obstacles standing between Angolans and peace? The view of this writer is that both attitudes are not only defendable, but are also prudent. Let us examine why.

Rationale for Pessimism

The pessimists base their belief on the premise that Dr. Savimbi does not admit defeat willingly or accept an inferior status to anyone. A peace process which reaffirms his second place finish in the 1992 elections is de facto an unacceptable defeat for him. They point to the record to justify this view. In their opinion, Dr. Savimbi belatedly and reluctantly authorized the signing of the Lusaka protocol because he had to halt the precipitous deterioration in UNITA's military situation. He never had a positive motivation to make peace or to adhere to the treaty. Rather, he was so viscerally opposed to it that he imprisoned the UNITA official who signed it soon after he returned from Lusaka.

Since Lusaka, Savimbi has said repeatedly that no military leader can disarm and survive. He is the quintessential survivor, the pessimists remind us, ergo, he is the quintessential foot-dragger in the process to disarm UNITA as required by the treaty. There is no U.N. verification possible that can confirm that Dr. Savimbi has disbanded his military command and control structure. Nor is there any way to guarantee that he could not return UNITA to low-intensity warfare or lead it to resort to terrorism. The logical conclusion to this line of reasoning is that there is no secure peace possible with Dr. Savimbi in the equation.

Reason for Hope

The optimists - and I am firmly in this camp - take a different approach. Look at the enormous progress under the U.N. peacekeeping missions, we say. Since Lusaka, Angola has had its longest period without war since well before independence. There is not yet full peace and reconciliation remains to be achieved. However, very important steps towards these objectives have been taken. UNITA has come into the government of unity and national reconciliation, the "GURN". It is not perfect, but it exists and has made progress towards more representative democracy.

National administration has not been extended to every municipality, and notably not to the key UNITA strongholds of Andulo and Bailundo. There are security problems in other areas that may or may not be attributable to "banditry". However, the GURN is in place in 95% of the towns and cities of Angola; commerce and people are moving in areas that had been closed since 1992; UNITA has turned over to the Government and private owners the alluvial diamond fields of Lunda Norte, the source of most of its revenue for the last five years. UNITA has formally demilitarized and demobilized and has been formally legalized. It now needs peace and the free movement of commerce for its legally constituted diamond company, SMD, to succeed.

The Carrot or the Stick

The optimists stress incentives along the road to permanent peace. If UNITA had not been motivated to establish its legal diamond affiliate, if it had not been drawn into negotiations to develop a stake in a legitimate diamond business, then there would never have been the "gentleman's agreement" by Dr. Savimbi to leave the Lunda diamond fields at the end of last year. The pessimists reply that the real reason that UNITA moved out of the Lundas is because it had to. The increasing strength of the government's military presence in the area and its success in shutting down the supply routes that UNITA had developed through the Congos made it unprofitable and dangerous for UNITA to continue its unauthorized mining.

The optimists point out that UNITA and the Government are increasingly able to reach agreement in direct negotiations, as was the case in the discussions that led to the January and March declarations. The pessimists remind us that it was only after the U.N. Security Council implemented its second package of sanctions against UNITA last October that the two sides negotiated directly and successfully. Thus go the arguments between those predicting an early conclusion to the peace process and those fearing an imminent decline to new disaster.

Keeping On

Pragmatists might note that this debate does not need a winner. The key fact is that an approach which mixes liberally both incentives and disincentives has worked for the past three years in Angola. Despite doubts about the ultimate intentions of their old adversaries, skeptics within UNITA or the Government are willing to agree that there has been progress and neither pessimists nor optimists favor changing strategies or tactics right now.

Under these circumstances, two thoughts come to mind concerning the role of the international community and the U.N. peacekeeping mission. First, congratulations for having stuck successfully with a very difficult process through bad times and good. Second, soldier on; this game is still worth seeing through to the end.